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This article was written as a tribute to Professor Ronald Coase. It acknowledges his scholarly 
contributions to understanding the existence and boundaries of the firm, and the role of legal 
rules in organizing economic activity. It also recognizes the reflexivity, realism, simplicity and 





As students, researchers and lecturers, we often have our favourite authors, those whose work 
we follow, share, discuss and treasure. Ronald Coase, whom I never met in person, is definitely 
one of my preferred scholars. Coase, who was awarded in 1991 the prize in economic sciences 
in memory of Alfred Nobel, is known for revealing the importance of transaction costs for the 
organization of economic activity: transaction costs explain the existence and scope of different 
modes of organization (Coase 1993 [1937]), and play a crucial role in determining the allocation 
of rights over the use of resources (Coase 1959; 1960). Coase also uncovered the role played by 
social norms and laws in reducing transaction costs, and his account of the role of regulation in 
the economy has been of major influence in “new institutional economics” and in the emergence 
of “law and economics” as a field of study. However, the emphasis on his pioneering role in 
“law and economics” and on his inputs to a renewed interest in economic institutionalism often 
obscures the importance of Coase for management studies and actual organizations. One of the 
purposes of this paper is indeed to highlight this contribution. But there is another aim to this 
paper, which is that of acknowledging Coase for his defence of realism in economic analysis, 
for the simplicity of his writings and for the wit of his discourse. Together with seminal 
scholarly contributions, these features have definitely built my esteem for the outstanding work 
of Ronald Coase. I hope the following paragraphs are able to pay him tribute.  
 
2. TRANSACTION COSTS AND THE THEORY(IES) OF THE FIRM 
 
The concept of transaction costs was developed by Coase as he reflected on the reasons for the 
existence of firms: “the main reason why it is profitable to establish a firm would seem to be 
that there is a cost of using the price mechanism” (Coase 1993 [1937], p. 21) – so simply stated, 
by the way. In a context of specialization of labour, economic agents must balance the costs of 
acquiring in the market the goods and services needed, with the costs of producing them 
internally. Therefore, a firm will emerge when the costs of discovering the relevant price - that 
is, the costs of acquiring and processing information and of negotiating and concluding a 
separate contract for each exchange transaction which takes place on a market - exceed the costs 
of hierarchy, namely the cost of increased bureaucracy associated with vertical integration. The 
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limit to the size of the firm is set where the costs of organizing a transaction internally equal 
those of organizing it through the market. 
 
The idea that transactions involve costs which vary with alternative structures of governance 
was unorthodox in mainstream economics. At the time, the dominant view was that of goods 
and services being traded through the use of prices that incorporated all the relevant 
information, which rational individuals were perfectly capable of acquiring and processing in 
their self-interest seeking. Within this framework, the firm was reduced to a production 
function, a “black box” where inputs were transformed into outputs, and there was scarce 
interest in studying its nature and size. How was it, then, that Coase came to realize the 
importance of transaction costs in the choice of mode of organization?  
 
According to Coase, “[I]t came about as the result of a series of accidents” (Coase 1993, p. 36), 
meaning that there was not a planned route leading to his interest for industrial economics and 
organizations. Instead, it was the fact that he did not study Latin and had not a taste for 
mathematics that lead him to enrol at the London School of Economics and Political Science 
(LSE), where he took a variety of courses (such as law, industrial psychology, French and 
accounting), met Arnold Plant – whose teaching had the greatest influence on Coase – and 
learned economics from discussions with fellow students such as Ronald Fowler. It was also 
while at the LSE that Coase earned a travelling scholarship that allowed him to spend a year in 
the United States studying the different ways in which industries were organized. This visit 
seems to have made a significant imprint on Coase’s approach to the organization of economic 
activity, as well as on his views regarding research methods in economics and management: 
 
“During my time in the United States I attended very few classes and although I visited a 
number of universities, most of my time was spent in visiting businesses and industrial 
plants. Before I went to America, Ernest Bevin, the secretary of the biggest trade union in 
Britain, the Transport and General Workers Union, had approached Bruce Gardner of 
the Bank of England on my behalf. Gardner gave me letters of introduction to various 
businessmen in the United States, and as a result I had little difficulty in meeting them. I 
still remember one most instructive day I spent in the office of a purchasing agent, I think 
at Union Carbide, listening to his telephone conversations, a visit which gave me a lively 
sense of the possibilities of substitution. While in the United States I read reports of the 
Federal Trade Commission and books describing the organization of different industries, 
such as Copeland’s study of the cotton textile industry. I also read trade periodicals and 
used more unusual sources (for an economist), such as the yellow pages of the telephone 
directory, where I was fascinated to find so many specialist firms operating within what 
we thought of as a single industry as well as such interesting combinations of activities as 
those represented by coal and ice companies. What I was in fact doing in America was 
looking for clues which would enable me to solve the puzzles that I took there with me. 
The extraordinary thing is that I think I succeeded.” (Coase 1993, p. 39)  
 
While in the United States, Coase maintained correspondence with his fellow Ronald Fowler. In 
his letters he assessed the discussions had with some of the academics he met (such as Wassily 
Leontief, Frank Knight and Jacob Viner), described his visits to industrial plants and their 
suppliers and, most importantly, raised questions that were argued with Fowler in their 
exchanges. This correspondence seems to have worked as a kind of maieutic, allowing Coase to 
develop his arguments around the questions asked, and succeed “in linking up organization with 
cost” (Coase 1993, p. 47). One should note here how Coase’s inquisitive mind certainly played 
an important role in his work: his curiosity for knowledge is evident in his method of learning 
from inquiring others, exchanging views, dwelling into the reality of business and finally 
reflexively integrating it all.  
 
The argument made by Coase regarding the importance of realism in economic analysis must 




“My article [on The Nature of the Firm] starts by making a methodological point: it is 
desirable that the assumptions we make in economics should be realistic. Most readers 
will pass over the opening sentences (Putterman omits them when reprinting my article), 
and others will excuse what they read as a youthful mistake, believing, as so many 
modern economists do, that we should choose our theories on the basis of the accuracy of 
their predictions, the realism of their assumptions being utterly irrelevant. I did not 
believe this in the 1930s and, as it happens, I still do not.” (Coase 1993, p. 52)  
 
At the time when Coase published “The Nature of the Firm”, researchers were dedicated to the 
study of how supply and demand determined prices. The sum of exchanges between large 
numbers of faceless buyers and sellers constituted the competitive market, which should be 
safeguarded and fostered as the most efficient governance structure. Non-market forms of 
organization were regarded with suspicion and the firm, whose existence was taken for granted, 
was reduced to a production function. The focus of economists, as above mentioned, was on 
accurate prediction, not on real understanding. The work of Coase was marginalised
2
 and his 
insight that the market is not always the most efficient way of organizing a transaction remained 
in the shadow of economic thinking until it was recovered by Oliver Williamson (1975; 1985), 
who in 2009 was also granted a prize in economic sciences in memory of Alfred Nobel, “for his 
analysis of economic governance, especially the boundaries of the firm" (Nobelprize.org 2013).  
 
Williamson was directly inspired by the Coasean argument that firms and markets are 
alternative means of organization whose adoption depends on the respective transaction costs. 
However, he added that “unless the factors responsible for transaction cost differences could be 
identified, the reasons for organizing some transactions one way and other transactions another 
would necessarily remain obscure” (Williamson 1985, p. 4). Hence, he set out to identify the 
factors responsible for transaction costs, arguing in favour of a discriminating alignment 
between transactions and organizations that takes into consideration human aspects (bounded 
rationality and opportunism) and objective factors of the transaction (especially asset 
specificity). Building on Coase’s insights, Williamson developed a theory that not only 
addresses the problem of boundaries of the firm – by analysing make-or-buy decisions as a 
choice between alternative modes of organization - but also helps in dealing with aspects of 
internal organization such as those regarding structure and the use of formalization as a means 
for dealing with opportunism. Despite critiques regarding the methodology (e.g. Hodgson 1989; 
Pratten 1997) and the static nature of a theory that cannot account for inter-temporal 
inseparability of the mechanisms of governance (Argyres and Liebeskind 1999) nor for 
institutional change (Robins 1987; North 1990; Dacin, Goodstein et al. 2002), Williamson’s 
transaction cost economics has flourished: it has been used to address issues of contracts in 
several industries in the private and public sectors, such as, for example, electricity generation 
(Joskow 1985), automobile (Monteverde and Teece 1982), pharmaceutical (Pisano 1990), 
aerospace (Masten 1984) and health (Montgomery 1997); it has been employed to explain the 
existence of multinational enterprises (Hennart 2001); and in reviews on empirical work using 
transaction cost economics, both Shelanski and Klein (1995) and Macher and Richman (2005) 
found considerable support of transaction cost economics predictions, in particular in cases 
concerning the boundaries of the firm. 
 
3. TRANSACTION COSTS, PROPERTY RIGHTS, AND ECONOMIC POLICY 
 
In 1960 Coase published “The Problem of Social Cost”, in which he claimed that production 
factors should be thought of as rights over the use of resources, and not as physical units. This 
claim originated in the study of the bidding process of the radio frequency spectrum, where 
Coase asserts that “a private-enterprise system cannot function properly unless property rights 
are created in resources, and, when this is done, someone wishing to use a resource has to pay 
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the owner to obtain it. Chaos disappears; and so does the government except that a legal system 
to define property rights and to arbitrate disputes is, of course, necessary” (Coase 1959, p. 14). 
Since a radio frequency is intangible, and its utility depends on its use and that of the adjacent 
frequencies, Coase thought of it as the bundle of rights linked to the emission of electrical 
radiations (Coase 1988). Coase viewed exchange as the buying and selling of rights to perform 
certain actions, and showed that in a world where transactions are costless, the legal rights will 
be rearranged through exchange to those who value them the most. In such a zero transaction 
costs world, Coase argues that “it does not matter what the law is, since people can always 
negotiate without cost to acquire, subdivide, and combine rights whenever this would increase 
the value of production. In such a world the institutions which make up the economic system 
have neither substance nor purpose” (Coase 1988, p. 14). This assertion came to be known as 
“the Coase Theorem”, a term given by Stigler in 1966 (Medema 2011) that Coase did not like. 
But why was it that Coase disliked “the Coase theorem”? 
 
In a nutshell, what was later labelled as “the Coase theorem” was merely an intellectual exercise 
on the (ir)relevance of the law in a virtual world of costless transactions. Coase’s purpose in 
“The Problem of Social Cost” was not to study an imaginary system of zero transaction costs, 
but to explain how transaction costs can affect the working of the economic system: “In order to 
carry out a market transaction it is necessary to discover who it is that one wishes to deal with, 
to inform people that one wishes to deal and on what terms, to conduct negotiations leading up 
to a bargain, to draw up the contract, to undertake the inspection needed to make sure that the 
terms of the contract are being observed, and so on. These operations are often extremely 
costly, sufficiently costly at any rate to prevent many transactions that would be carried out in a 
world in which the pricing system worked without cost” (Coase 1960, p. 15).  
 
Coase was concerned with organizational and institutional responses to the existence of 
transaction costs. His aim was that of developing a framework for analysing the organization of 
economic activity that accounted for the existence and varying intensity of transaction costs. 
Thus, he regretted that further discussions of his work concentrated on “the Coase theorem” and 
on discovering its limitations: “It would not seem worthwhile to spend much time investigating 
the properties of such a world [of costless transactions]. What my argument does suggest is the 
need to introduce positive transaction costs explicitly into economic analysis so that we can 
study the world that exists. This has not been the effect of my article” (Coase 1988, p. 15) 
(parentheses added). In a recent EconTalk interview hosted by Russ Roberts, when asked about 
his memories of the dinner at Aaron Director’s house at the University of Chicago
3
 (where his 
views on the role of transaction costs in economic activity were discussed with a number of 
distinguished economists such as Aaron Director, George Stigler, Reuben Kessel and Milton 
Friedman), Coase restated this view: 
 
“It [the discussion had during dinner] changed their views. It changed their views in a 
very sensible way, because they went on to talk about something called the Coase 
Theorem, and I never liked ‘the Coase Theorem’ […] I don't like it because it's a 
proposition about a system in which there were no transaction costs. It's a system which 
couldn't exist. And therefore it's quite unimaginable. […]Well, in a way, it's unfortunate 
that I did that [departed from a zero transaction cost world to explore his argument] . I 
only did this in order to explain my views. I thought, let's talk about a system where there 
were no transaction costs. But it's an imaginary system. There always are transactions 
costs. […]It took a whole evening of all these economists to get it right. But then in the 
end they didn't get it right, because they amended something called the Coase Theorem, 
which I don't like.” (Coase 2012) (parentheses added). 
 
From a legal scholar perspective, it is interesting to note the fundamental insight of “The 
Problem of Social Cost”: if the rearrangement of property rights through exchange involves 
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costs, the initial distribution of property rights (which include liability) established by the law is 
not irrelevant: law matters. The law ought to be examined so as to anticipate the economic 
consequences of the distribution of rights it establishes, and it should be altered whenever it is 
shown that an alternative distribution of rights is more efficient. Coase (1988) explicitly referred 
to the importance of private legal systems and of formal state laws as means through which 
transaction costs can be reduced. Nevertheless, he seemed to view state laws as a second-best, 
since he wrote that they should be used in situations in which the establishment and 
enforcement of a private legal system is difficult: “When the physical facilities are scattered 
and owned by a vast number of people with very different interests, as is the case with retailing 
and wholesaling, the establishment and administration of a private legal system would be very 
difficult. Those operating in these markets have to depend, therefore, on the legal system of the 




Coase blamed the misunderstanding of his point on the “blackboard economics” approach of 
neoclassical economic analysis: economists felt more at ease at dealing with abstractions than 
with the problems of the real world. As he recently recalled, “blackboard economics is 
economics which you can put on the blackboard, in which you study an imaginary system. It's 
not empirically based at all. It's not concerned with what really happens. It's what you imagine 
could happen and what you imagined didn't happen. So, I've been very critical of modern 
economics, which is too abstract. That's called blackboard economics. It's something you can 
put on the blackboard but that doesn't exist” (Coase 2012). This rejection of formalism in 
favour of a more realistic account of economic activity grounded in empirical work was of great 
importance for Coase. He appreciated the fact that Joan Robinson said that his concept of the 
firm was both “realistic and manageable” (Coase 1993, p. 52), he wrote that “the degree to 
which economics is isolated from the ordinary business of life is extraordinary and unfortunate” 
(Coase 2012), and he argued that he would “like to see people go study how things actually 
work”, and “not all this abstract theorizing, all this mathematics” (Coase 2012). This is hardly 
surprising for someone whose insights on the nature of the firm are so strongly linked to 
personal experiences of visiting factories and speaking to managers, and whose thoughts on the 





It may be argued that the misunderstanding of Coasean contributions that lead to a focus on “the 
Coase theorem” was due to Coase himself. To begin with, although he highlighted the need to 
understand economic activity in its social context, he built his arguments from a general-
equilibrium framework based on the model of exchange (Deakin and Michie 1997; Campbell 
and Picciotto 1998): in “The Nature of the Firm”, the point of departure is the market - firms 
exist because there is a cost in using the price mechanism; and in “The Problem of Social Cost”, 
the first part of the paper is dedicated to exchange in a world of zero transaction costs. Coase’s 
view of economic activity is not one which is based in relations of production-reproduction, but 
one based on trading goods or services (or, more precisely, the property rights over goods and 
services) for a price (Campbell and Picciotto 1998). Consequently, it is not surprising that 
further developments of Coasean arguments focused on the process of exchange and its 
conditions of efficiency. Since exchange is based on the principle of freedom of contract, and 
regulation is viewed as constraining it, a minimal role for state law was advocated. Legal 
regulation was thus viewed as a corrective mechanism: “the law intervenes to correct market 
outcomes which are the result of imperfections in the process of exchange, either by allocating 
property rights ex ante, or through ex post redistribution based on liability rules and/or 
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regulation…This gives rise to a view that legal regulation can be used to adjust economic 
outcomes in a way which is consonant with the goal of allocative efficiency” (Deakin and 
Pratten 1999, p. 5). Furthermore, such developments suited well the political context of the 
1960s and 1970s, when the role of the state in relation to economic activity was under a re-
evaluation (e.g. Montgomery 1997; Campbell and Picciotto 1998). In addition, although Coase 
pleaded for more realistic and empirically grounded analyses of economic activity, he did not 
clearly detach himself from the neo-classical economics method. Actually, he endorsed the 
work developed by researchers engaged in “law and economics”, which he thought to be 
making progress in discovering the effects of varying the law in the working of the economic 
system (Coase 1988).  
 
It seems to me, though, that this retrospective exercise on how far is Coase responsible for the 
misunderstanding of his arguments is not of much use, especially since Coase extensively wrote 
and spoke - and in a quite self-critical manner - on the origin, meaning and influence of his 
work. Besides, it must be noted that the departure from unrealistic assumptions allowed Coase 
to attract his audience – most of them economists used to simplifications for reasoning purposes 




Looking at his original contributions, what is to be emphasized is how Coase brought forward 
the need to consider the costs of transacting in the organization and definition of the boundaries 
of the firm, as well as the need to account for the role of regulation in reducing those costs; and 
how he championed for a realist turn in economics, one that may allow the discipline to be 
relevant for managers and entrepreneurs. His insights are at the origin of “new institutional 
economics” and its preoccupation for the role of institutions in the organization of economic 
activity, and are also a pillar of “law and economics” and its concern with the economic analysis 
of legal rules (be it for explanatory and predictive purposes, or be it for recommending what 
rules should be used to achieve specific public policy aims). But, as it was put forth right at the 
start of this paper, the work on transaction costs and their role in the organization of economic 
activity is not the only reason why Coase is one of my favourite authors. To be true, it was the 
simplicity - and reflexivity - of his writings and the inherent humour of his discourse that 
captivated me.  
 
As a trained lawyer with scarce knowledge of mathematics and statistics (and actually no 
knowledge of econometrics), I often struggle with economic texts. My main research interest is 
regulation, particularly media regulation, but very frequently I feel unable to assess the quality 
of arguments presented in papers on the subject, given their high level of formalization. I must 
say I never felt this while reading Coase
6
. Take, for instance, the paper on “Durability and 
Monopoly”, where Coase (1972) explores at what price a monopolist supplier should sell his 
stock of a completely durable good: the paper has seven pages of text and uses two very simple 
charts to support the reasoning made; no mathematics is used, but the argument - known as “the 
Coase conjecture” - is clearly apprehensible. The same may be said about the “Federal 
Communications Commission” paper (Coase 1959), where the extensive use of documentary 
data such as letters, speeches in public hearings and official reports helps build a clear and vivid 
argument. Coase’s papers are written in a captivating manner, through the frequent use of 
examples, the advancing of rhetorical questions to call the reader’s attention, and the initial 
setting of unrealistic assumptions from which the complexity of real world conditions is then 
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developed. This approach makes Coase’s work accessible beyond the realm of orthodox 
mainstream economics. 
 
The simplicity of Coase is also evident in his reflexive stances. As a young student I was quite 
surprised by the spirited tone that infused the trilogy of his lectures on the origin, meaning and 
influence of “The Nature of the Firm” (Coase 1993; Coase 1993; Coase 1993). Indeed this is the 
start of this trilogy:  
 
“’It is difficult for a man to speak long of himself without vanity’. So said David Hume at 
the beginning of his autobiography. If David Hume felt such a warning to be necessary, a 
man who, according to Adam Smith, approached ‘as nearly to the idea of a perfectly wise 
and virtuous man, as perhaps the nature of human frailty will permit’, it is hardly to be 
expected that my lectures will be free from vanity. However, a natural tendency to be 
overindulgent in dealing with my own work will be somewhat curbed by a real desire on 
my part to understand why ‘The Nature of the Firm’ has been treated by the economics 
profession in the way it has.” (Coase 1993, p. 34)  
 
Coase continued in these lectures as if they were a kind of exercise in self-awareness. When 
reflecting on the influence of “The Nature of the Firm” he pointed to a number of weaknesses 
he identified in his paper, and this paragraph is quite illustrative: 
 
“But leaving aside the inherent difficulties of the subject, it now seems to me that there 
was a weakness in my exposition in ‘The Nature of the Firm’ that hampered further 
development. I was aware of this weakness at the time the article was published, but it 
was not until I came to prepare this lecture that I realized how serious this may have been 
for the development of the subject. […] I consider that one of the main weaknesses of my 
article stems from the use of the employer-employee relationship as the archetype of the 
firm. It gives an incomplete picture of the nature of the firm. But more important, I 
believe it misdirects our attention.” (Coase 1993, p. 64)  
 
This reflexive stance is evident throughout Coase’s endeavours: from his correspondence with 
Ronald Fowler to his request of a meeting with Chicago economists to debate his argument on 
the FCC paper, from his discussions with fellow lecturers and student to the above mentioned 
trilogy. But what also strikes one while reading or hearing to Coase is the wit and humour of his 
discourse. So I end this paper with two of these instances: 
 
To celebrate the centennial of the University of Chicago Law School, Coase was invited to give 
the annual Coase lecture; and the audience laughed out loud as he said, right at the beginning: 
“It’s a somewhat strange experience for me to be giving a Coase lecture. After all, any lecture I 
give is a Coase lecture”! It is actually a delight for a reader to see how such an influent 
economist maintains his wittiness and ability to not taking himself too seriously. In 2012, during 
his EconTalk interview, when asked by Russ Roberts if he knew Keynes, Coase replied: 
 
 “I can tell you: I was helping when Britain was trying to get a loan from the United 
States immediately after the war, and I was talking to one of Keynes's assistants. And 
Keynes came in the room and walked over to us and the man I was talking to us said, 
‘This is Coase, who is helping us with the statistics. I don't think you know him.’ And 
Keynes said, ‘No, I don't.’ And walked off. And that's my life with Keynes.” 
 
Russ Roberts laughed when Coase said this, and to be true I also laughed alone in my office 
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